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Abstract
This contribution discusses the links between Martin Krygier’s and Philip Selznick’s 
work on the ideal of the rule of law. The way Krygier explains and reconstructs 
Selznick’s theory is helpful, and yet raises questions about the content and applica-
tion of the ideal. Understanding the development of the rule of law and the interrela-
tion with another central legal ideal, justice, requires not only a realistic assessment 
but also a theoretical engagement with the ideals at stake.
Life is a web of relationships. My first introduction to Martin Krygier’s work was 
by our common inspiration, Philip Selznick. When I started researching the rule of 
law more specifically, Krygier’s teleological rule of law theory and his ideas about 
context and tradition became crucial contributions that helped me clarify my own 
thinking about the rule of law. Although these were different routes, they are held 
together by the Selznick connection. For quite a few years, talking to him meant ask-
ing about his Selznick project, which eventually became the book Philip Selznick: 
Ideals in the World (1964). Considering these links I realized that, maybe even 
more than his rule of law work as such, I appreciate Krygier’s unwavering loyalty 
to Selznick’s thought and his mission to show its relevance. It therefore seems apt 
to devote this contribution to an engagement with the rule of law in the context of 
Selznick’s theory. Krygier reconstructs and organizes Selznick’s theory of ideals in 
such a way that it helps grasp the elusive ideal of the rule of law, but hard questions 
remain, particularly when it comes to the different directions to choose from to get 
beyond the abstract ideal.
As Krygier shows, Selznick’s views of law and the rule of law were part of a 
broader vision of the importance of values in human life and a concern for the obsta-
cles to their realization. Krygier unpacks the place of values in research by distin-
guishing four ways in which they play a role in Selznick’s work (2012, 204–206). 
The first is the claim that people have values, that they matter to them. As Krygier 
points out, this claim is embedded in Selznick´s Deweyan philosophy: that people 
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refer to values in problem-solving (Krygier 2012, 204). The second way in which 
values figure is as unifying many of our practices into normative systems governed 
by a master ideal, law being a prime example (Selznick 1961). The third claim is that 
a researcher can assess the extent to which values are realized in a particular norma-
tive system. This claim, for which Krygier coins the term ´clinical assessment´, is 
probably most clearly explained in ´A Normative Theory of Culture´ (Jaeger and 
Selznick 1964). One of Selznick´s ongoing concerns was with qualitative states of 
social practices and in this article he applied the idea to cultures: some cultures can 
be seen as weak, others as strong. Such an assessment involves appraising the extent 
to which values are realized in social life. The fourth claim is the most controver-
sial, that values may be used to evaluate morally, based on one´s own convictions 
(Krygier 2012, 205). For Selznick, such evaluations can be objectively warranted. 
At that point, Selznick can be characterized as a naturalist about values: in certain 
contexts, specific values are good. As Krygier argues, the first two claims can eas-
ily be accepted by any social scientist. The third and fourth claims are controver-
sial, because they involve normative judgments on the part of the researcher. I think 
that making the distinction between the third claim, assessment based on internal 
standards of a normative system, and the fourth, moral evaluation tout court, is par-
ticularly helpful for lawyers and rule of law scholars. Recognizing the legal stand-
ards internal to a normative system as standards of assessment does not necessarily 
lead to endorsing these values as one’s own moral or political convictions. Using 
the ideal as a standard is important to get beyond a simple reference to what people 
believe in. It is not particularly clear, however, how to derive the rule of law ideal 
that is to serve as the standard, nor is it an easy task to justify one’s formulation of it.
To make good use of the idea of a clinical assessment of the rule of law, it seems 
important to have a clear idea, not only of the core ideal, but also of the ways in 
which it can be (partly) realized or violated. In order to make such a judgment, we 
need to recognize elements in legal practices as positive or negative in terms of the 
rule of law. It has always puzzled me why both Krygier and Selznick have resisted 
formulating more specific rule of law qualities. Their common strategy is to formu-
late the ideal of the rule of law theoretically, as the ideal we need to accept if we 
want to understand the central purpose, and to argue that there is immense variation 
in the realization of that ideal in legal practices, which demands attention to con-
text (Krygier 2011, 69; Krygier 2009; Selznick 2003). Selznick defines the rule of 
law, or the ideal of legality as “the progressive reduction of arbitrariness in positive 
law and its administration” (1969, 12). Krygier shares the focus on arbitrariness, but 
specifies the problem as arbitrary exercise of power. Both Krygier and Selznick are 
interested in extending the reach of the rule of law beyond the state, but with what I 
see as a slightly different approach. Where Selznick looks for broader developments 
towards recognition of legality, Krygier is primarily interested in power relation-
ships in various contexts (Selznick 1969; Krygier 2016). Thus, while looking at the 
same practice, such as powerful private organizations, they approach the problem 
differently: Selznick identifies legal authority and legal activities of private actors 
first, Krygier turns more directly to the social problem of how powerful private 
actors exercise that power (2016, 215). It could be mainly a matter of defining the 
problem, but it may also be due to the ambitions for the theory: Selznick’s ambition 
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was to develop a sociological jurisprudence, Krygier’s to develop a theory of the 
rule of law (Krygier 2017). A few other differences are significant: Krygier does not 
claim that the problem is about positive law, but rather that law is the core means to 
counter arbitrariness. He gives different formulations of what the rule of law may do 
to arbitrary power. A small sample: it is “legal reduction of the possibility of arbi-
trary exercise of power by those in a position to wield significant power” (Krygier 
2011, 75), “curbing arbitrariness in the exercise of power” (2006, 133), or “temper-
ing the exercise of power” (2017, 302). The focus in Krygier’s definition shifts from 
a quantitative reduction to a qualitative change, a better exercise of power. The rule 
of law is not simply about less exercise of power, which may be dangerous too, but 
about a use of power in a more acceptable way (2016, 224). What is most significant 
here in comparison to Selznick is that Krygier does not speak about ‘progressive’ 
reduction. On the contrary, we can have too much of a good thing; seeking to real-
ize non-arbitrariness endlessly may lead us to claim too much for the rule of law. It 
is just one value, after all. Whereas Selznick and Krygier are both realists about the 
ideal of the rule of law, I would say that Selznick is the one who has higher hopes.
In my view, this is the point where rule of law thinking in the Selznick/Krygier 
vein comes to a fork in the road. Either we follow Krygier’s path and say that rule 
of law is just one value, but that there are others that are equally important for law, 
or we follow Selznick’s and pack the rule of law with richer notions of non-arbi-
trariness. I see the choice as one between different forms of theorizing the plural-
ism of ideals: is the rule of law one ideal among a number of legal ideals, or is it 
an overarching ideal with more constitutive values? Another way to see it is as the 
question where to locate variation: is it only the practice that varies or is it also the 
ideal itself? The easiest illustration of the point is the way the rule of law figures 
in Selznick’s best-known book, Law and Society in Transition (Nonet and Selznick 
1978). Nonet and Selznick show how an internal dynamic pushes law from a stage 
of repressive law, in which law is a crude instrument of politics, to autonomous law, 
in which law’s integrity and formality are central, to a third stage of responsive law, 
in which law serves a substantive purpose and is linked to policy. One of the dis-
tinguishing traits of the three types of law is their relationship to the rule of law. 
Repressive law, serving political power, does not include a rule of law orientation. 
In autonomous law, by contrast, the rule of law is the central concern. Krygier criti-
cizes Law and Society in Transition for the “identification of the rule of law with a 
particular configuration of institutions rather than a large and variously implementa-
ble, ‘practical ideal’…” (2012, 175).1 As Krygier shows, identifying the rule of law 
with the institutions of formal law is inconsistent with Selznick’s other work, which 
is open to expanding the rule of law to other practices and institutions.2 Krygier 
argues that the strength of seeing the rule of law as a practical ideal is lost if it is tied 
to specific institutional settings or mechanisms. An ideal can be variably realized 
and needs to be realized in different ways in different contexts. If we see the rule of 
law as an ideal, it can also be connected to other types of law. One of the important 
1 The reference to the rule of law as a practical ideal comes from Selznick (1999, p 21).
2 Most importantly, Selznick (1969), which extends the reach of the rule of law to private power.
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points made by Krygier is that autonomous law and responsive law should not be 
regarded as separate stages: responsive law builds on a framework of autonomous 
law (192). Once the baseline of autonomous law is in place, there are opportunities 
for introducing responsive law. For him, Selznick’s arguments entail that we need to 
pay attention to the strength of the legal order; where the legal institutions are strong 
already, departing from formal rules and focusing on policy and purpose is safe, 
where legal institutions and the legal profession are weak, this is a dangerous strat-
egy (193–194). Krygier is right in concluding that “… responsive law is to be built 
on an autonomous legal order; it is not intended to undermine it” (192).
However, I think this has important implications for the rule of law as a theoreti-
cal construct. On the basis of the connection between autonomous and responsive 
law, we can also see continuities in the rule of law ideal connected to each type. 
Most importantly, the idea of legality as the progressive reduction of arbitrariness 
does not disappear in responsive law, it takes a different form: “To press for a maxi-
mum feasible reduction of arbitrariness is to demand a system of law that is capable 
of reaching beyond formal regularity and procedural fairness to substantive justice.” 
(Nonet and Selznick 1978, 108). Using the same definition of legality as in the ear-
lier work, Nonet and Selznick stress that legality remains the master ideal of law. 
To my mind, Krygier’s critique that they identify the rule of law with autonomous 
law is not really deserved. It is true that the rule of law is sometimes described as an 
institutional system rather than as an ideal (Nonet and Selznick 1978, 53), but the 
ideal of legality is still central. And since legality in the earlier work was taken to be 
identical to the ideal of the rule of law, the substance of the rule of law ideal is pre-
sent in responsive law too. The meaning of the rule of law ideal does change consid-
erably: in autonomous law, it demands negative restrictions on authority; in respon-
sive law, it demands the achievement of justice. I see this interpretation confirmed 
in Selznick’s discussion of law in The Moral Commonwealth; reading it differently 
than Krygier, who sees it as a correction of the earlier view (2012, 266). Here, the 
same notion of ‘progressive reduction of arbitrariness’ is now put forward as the aim 
of ‘a science of justice’ (Selznick 1992, 445). As Krygier also notes, Selznick sub-
scribes to the view that autonomous law and rule of law provide a baseline on which 
a more responsive legal order may be built. Does this mean that rule of law and jus-
tice are separate ideals? I think that would not be in line with Selznick’s integrative 
vision. If rule of law provides a baseline of limited arbitrariness in a legal order, that 
legal order only flourishes if it reaches beyond that to a vision of justice. The broad 
ideal of justice encompasses the more modest ideal of rule of law.
Where Selznick’s view changes by enlarging the aspirations invoked by the pro-
gressive reduction of arbitrariness, Krygier’s claims seem to become more modest. 
As rule of law scholars we might overplay our hand if we start to claim that rule of 
law is the way to build a just world. I believe it makes sense to distinguish the ideal 
of the rule of law from the ideal of justice. This does not mean, however, that the 
ideal of the rule of law can be kept separate from that ideal. Quite a while ago, I 
argued that both rule of law, or legality, and justice need to be seen as governing ide-
als of the practice of law and that their relative importance may vary (Taekema 2003, 
188). The focus of a particular legal system may shift from giving more weight to 
providing legal certainty—a central aspect of rule of law—to more realization of 
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real equality—a core notion of justice. For instance, the current discussions about 
the failure of the South-African constitution to alleviate structural inequalities can 
be read as a shift in emphasis from rule of law to justice. To be honest, I am not 
quite sure what Krygier thinks about this: is justice a legal ideal of similar import 
as the rule of law? When thinking about the rule of law, I find it difficult to keep 
these ideals separate; pragmatically, I see them as being distinguishable but inter-
connected. This means that I am happy with the idea of a rule of law ideal as limited 
to restraining arbitrary exercise of power, but that in practice this will touch upon 
different aspects of justice as well. As most rule of law scholars would agree, it is 
not meaningful to speak of non-arbitrariness without considering the fairness of pro-
cedure or the equal application of legal rules, both aspects that I see as expressing an 
ideal of justice. It is when the ideal of the rule of law needs to be applied to specific 
contexts that such conceptual distinctions become particularly difficult to uphold.
Moreover, an assessment of the rule of law as practiced in a particular context 
cannot escape specifying the meaning of the ideal. Although I agree with Krygier in 
the abstract that we cannot identify the rule of law ideal with particular institutional 
arrangements, in the current context of, for example, Hungary, Poland and Romania, 
it is the institutional principle of the independence of the judiciary that is used to 
judge whether the rule of law is under threat. But how should we view the relation-
ship between non-arbitrariness and the separation of powers? Judicial independence 
is regarded as a necessary component of the rule of law without a specific argument 
as to why it is so crucial. It seems that we fall back on the ‘laundry lists’ of rule of 
law requirements after all.
Specifying the ideal for application also makes the problem of the different con-
stitutive values of the rule of law acute. The variability of the problems of arbi-
trary power is mirrored by a variety of value dimensions of the rule of law. Krygier 
unpacks the problem and distinguishes three different senses of arbitrariness: whim-
sical power, unruliness, a lack of recognition of the interests of subjects (Krygier 
2016, 204). I associate these problems with the positive values we pursue to avoid 
them: with reasoned justification, with predictability, and with participation, while 
I would think that the fairness of decisions is also a crucial component (Mak and 
Taekema 2016). These values may sometimes reinforce each other and at other times 
conflict (Waldron 2011). This makes it hard to use them for assessment: when to pri-
oritize one over the other and why to do so are hard determinations to make. I used 
to think that a problem-solving orientation would help—paying sufficient attention 
to the specific context and experienced problems. I am less confident now: there are 
many situations in which people have different experiences and different interpre-
tations of what matters, also when it comes to the rule of law. Such pluralism not 
only calls for equal voice and participation but may also demand respect for, and 
predictable application of, the few principles that people do agree upon. This may 
mean that conserving institutions and principles that have protected the rule of law 
well enough in the past may be the best we can do. Although this is a less optimistic 
conclusion than I would like, this may be what realism about the rule of law ideal 
implies.
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